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Employment at Will in Illinois - Has the
Employer Been Forgotten?
A.

SCOPE OF ARTICLE

I.

INTRODUCTION

Much attention has recently focused on the common law doctrine
of employment at will which asserts that an employment agreement
with no specific term of duration is terminable at the will of either
the employer or employee. Historically, where a fixed-term contract
could not be found, neither party was under any obligation to continue
an employment arrangement; either party could terminate the relationship without reason or explanation. However, the employer's
freedom to terminate the employee has been slowly but steadily eroded
by statutory and judicial restraints at both the federal and state levels.

This Comment briefly examines the background of the employment at will doctrine' in general, and its present status in Illinois in
particular. The recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in Duldulao v.

St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center2 is of particular import in

evaluating the direction of the employment at will doctrine. A rec-

ommendation is then made that further deterioration should be minimized to support the freedom of the parties to contract. Additionally,
a call is made for the Illinois General Assembly to restrict the erosion

of the doctrine by clarifying pertinent terminology. Except for comparison purposes, this Comment deals strictly with non-union private
employees. Organized labor3 and public sector employees 4 are outside

1. "An at will employment relationship is one which has no specific duration,
and such a relationship may be terminated at will by either the employer or the
employee, for or without cause." Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 I11.App.
3d 664, 667, 384 N.E.2d 91, 93 (1978). The same principle is variously referred to as
"employment at will," "terminable at will," and "right to hire-right to fire."
2. 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
3. Employees covered by collective bargaining agreements are protected from
arbitrary and capricious discharge. Contracts normally require discharges be for "just
cause." The national workforce as a whole is protected from discharge for participation in union activities by the United State's national labor policy as embodied in
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1982) (amended Supp. V
1987).
4. See, e.g., Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (state college teacher
had no express contractual rights but could not be discharged without a pretermination
hearing). See generally J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. N. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW § 13.5(d) (3d ed. 1986); M. PLAYER, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW ch. III
(1988).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

the scope of this article because specific laws have exclusive application
to these employment settings.
B.

BACKGROUND OF THE EMPLOYMENT AT WILL DOCTRINE

The evolution of the employment at will doctrine can be traced
to early American and English law.5 Initially, English law6 significantly
influenced American employer-employee relations. These laws were
encapsulated by William Blackstone, the Oxford law professor and

7
Solicitor General to the Queen of England, in his oft-quoted treatise:

If the hiring be general without any particular time limited,
the law construes it to be a hiring for a year; upon a principle
of natural equity, that the servant shall serve, and the master

maintain him, throughout all the revolutions of the respective
seasons; as well when there is work to be done, as when there

is not ....

8

In addition to establishing a presumption of a one-year term of
employment where none is provided, 9 Blackstone provided that "no
master can put away his servant, or a servant leave his master, either
before or at the end of his term, without a ... [three month notice]"
unless reasonable cause is established by a justice of the peace.' 0

5. See, e.g., I L. LARSON & P. BOROWSKY UNJUST DISMISSAL §§ 2.01-2.04
(1986) (hereinafter DISMISSAL); R. MORRIS, GOVERNMENT AND LABOR IN EARLY
AMERICA (1946); Comment, Protecting At Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 HARv. L. REV. 1816, 1824
(1980). Due to the plethora of quality material providing information on the history
and development of the doctrine, only a cursory review is provided here.
6. See, e.g., Davis v. Gorton, 16 N.Y. 255 (1857).
7. 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 413 (1966)
(reprint of 1st edition) (hereinafter BLACKSTONE).
8. Id. (footnote omitted).
9. Despite the obvious reference by "the revolutions of the respective seasons"
to agricultural and other seasonal workers, (i.e., the theory was that it would not be
fair to an employee to be released at the end of a growing season or for an employee
to quit after being "carried" by his employer throughout the slack time), the
presumption of a one-year hiring was applied to non-agricultural cases as well. See,
Annotation, Duration of Contract of Hiring Which Specified No Term, But Fixes
Compensation at a Certain Amount Per Day, Week, Month, or Year, 11 A.L.R.
469, 470 (1921) [hereinafter Annotation, Duration of Contract]. See also, Feinman,
The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 120
(1976).
10. 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 7, at 413.
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The "English rule," as it came to be known," was never consistently applied in American cases 12 and any vestiges of the English law
were shattered with the 1877 publication by H. G. Wood entitled A
TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND

SERVANT.

Wood espoused

what has become known as the "American Rule" of employment
law 3 when he wrote, "[w]ith us [in America] the rule is inflexible,
that a general or indefinite hiring is prima facie a hiring at will .. .
By changing the presumption from a one-year term to an inference
of no term whatsoever, Wood's Rule shifted the burden from requiring the employer to overcome the one-year presumption to requiring
the employee prove the intended duration of the agreement. 5 Despite
Wood's evident lack of precedential support for his statement,' 6 the
majority of American courts adopted his matter-of-fact position 7 by
the turn of the century.' 8

11. DISMISSAL, supra note 5, at § 2.02.
12. See, e.g., The Hudson, 12 F. Cas. 805 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1846) (No. 6831)
(employment agreement contained no term and court held that in absence of evidence
to the contrary, a hiring at monthly wages is regarded as a contract for a month).
13. DISMISsAL, supra note 5, at § 2.04.
14. H. WOOD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT 272 (1877).

Actually, the American courts seemed to be considering all pertinent facts and
circumstances surrounding the situation. "[T]he presumption [that the hiring was for
one year] was rebuttable by . . .other evidence .

. . ."

Feinman, The Development

of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 118, 123 (1976).
15. H. WOOD, A

TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MASTER AND SERVANT

272 (1877).

"[Ilf the servant seeks to [prove] a yearly hiring, the burden is upon him to establish
it by proof." Id.
16. See Annotation, Duration of Contract, supra note 9, at 476 ("To support
this proposition [stating the inflexible rule that an indefinite arrangement is a hiring
at will], Mr. Wood cites six cases, four American and two Scotch, no one of which

bears out his statement . . . ."(citations omitted)); Note, Implied ContractRights to
Job Security, 26 STAN. L. REV. 335, 341 (1974) ("Wood offered no analysis to justify

the assertion of this rule or his rejection of the English tradition. He cited only four
American cases as authority ...

none of which supported him.")

17. See Annotation, Duration of Contract, supra note 9, at 470-71 ("[T]he rule
runs uniformly through the American cases that an indefinite hiring is a hiring at
will." (citations omitted)). The earliest clear application of Wood's Rule in American
Law probably came in Payne v. The Western & Atlantic R.R. Co., 81 Tenn. 507
(1884) overruled on other grounds. "All employers may dismiss their employees atwill . . . for good cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without

being thereby guilty of legal wrong." Id. at 519-20.
18. The New York case of Martin v. New York Life Insurance Co., 148 N.Y.
117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895), is considered a leading case giving judicial support to
Wood's Rule. The high court of New York specifically, see Watson v. Gugino, 204
N.Y. 535, 98 N.E. 18, (1912), and without considering any factors other than the
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THE PRESENT STATUS OF THE LAW OF EMPLOYMENT AT WILL

Until relatively recently, the general rule was still that where the
employment agreement was for an indeterminate term, it was terminable at will;

9

either party was free to terminate the relationship at

any time and for any reason. 20 Federa 2 I and state22 statutes have

essentially eliminated the pure common law doctrine of employment
at will and additionally the courts themselves have eroded the doctrine
by developing various exceptions. Broadly, these exceptions can be
classified as contract, public policy, and tort violations.
1. Contract Theories
a. Good Faith and Fair Dealing

Where a terminated employee makes a claim against an employer
under a contract- theory, a frequent allegation is that the employer
lack of a contract, put an end to divergent applications among the lower courts of
the English Rule, the American Rule, or something in between. Thereby, the
philosophy of this country regarding employment began to change.
1967).

19. See 9 .

WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §

1017 (3d ed.

20. However, the employer was precluded from acting in an unlawfully discriminatory manner. See infra notes 21 and 22 and accompanying text.
21. E.g. Title VII, Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) et. seq. (1982
& Supp. IV 1986) (proscribing employment discrimination based on race, color,
national origin, sex, religious preference and for asserting these legal rights); Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7622 (1982) (proscribes discharge of employee who initiates or
testifies against his/her employer for violations of this act); Age Discrimination in
Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. §§ 623, 631, 633(a) (1982, Supp. 11 1984, Supp.
III 1985, Supp. IV 1986 & Supp. V 1987) (proscribes employment discrimination
based on age for employees aged 40 years of age and older and for asserting these
legal rights); Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1982)
(proscribes discrimination against employees asserting these legal rights); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1875 (1982) (proscribes discharge of employee serving on jury); Consumer Credit
Protection Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1674(a) (1982) (proscribes discharge of employee because
of any single indebtedness).
22. Illinois Human Rights Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-101 to 2-105
(1987) (proscribes employers from discharging employees on basis of race, color,
religion, national origin, ancestry, age, sex, marital status, handicap, et. al.); Workers'
Compensation Act, ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 48, para. 138.4(h) (1987) (employer is
prohibited from discharging employee for exercising his or her rights and remedies
under the Act); Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
paras. 39m-14(c) (1987) (employer proscribed from discharging employee who bring
claims under this law); Toxic Substances Disclosure to Employees Act, ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 48, para. 1414(b) (1987) (employer prohibited from discharging employee
who assist in the enforcement of this Act). See generally DIsMISsAL, supra note 5, at
10-83 to 10-86; Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1016, 366 N.E.2d 1141
(1977), rev'd, 74 Ill.2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979) (Workmen's Compensation Act
replaces common law rights).
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breached a contract containing an implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. This would seem to require some type of contractual
relationship between the employer and the at-will employee where
ostensibly none exists, 23 and generally comes in the form of an impliedin-law contract. 24 This contractual relationship manifests itself by way
25
of "the totality of the parties' relationship." Technically, an impliedin-law contract is an amalgam of both tort and contract law since its
existence depends not on the parties' intentions or promises but rather
on a court's assessment of what obligations should be a part of their
agreement. In addition to contract, 26 an at-will employee's cause of
of good faith and fair dealing
action based on an implied covenant
27 claim. 28
tort
a
of
form
the
take
can also
23. If a binding contract exists, the parties are bound by its terms. An
employment contract with a fixed duration is-not terminable at will. Stein v. Isse
Koch and Co., 350 11. App 171, 112 N.E.2d 491 (1953). "A contract ...

for a

definite term may not be terminated before the end of the term, except for cause or
by mutual agreement, unless the right to do so is reserved in the contract." 56 C.J.S.
Master & Servant § 29 (1948).
24. An implied in law (or quasi-contract) is not really a contract at all but
rather it is a non-contractual obligation "created by law for reasons of justice."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 4 comment b (1981). See generally Arthur
Rubloff & Co. v. Drovers National Bank of Chicago, 80 I11.App. 3d 867, 400
N.E.2d 614 (1980) (general discussion of implied contracts).
25. Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 329, 171 Cal. Rptr.
917, 927 (1981).

26. The leading case recognizing this cause of action was Monge v. Beebe
Rubber Co., 114 N.H.130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974) "[Tlermination by the employer of
a contract of employment at will which is motivated by bad faith .

.

. constitutes a

breach of the employment contract." Id. at 551. This case recognized only the
contract theory of recovery. The verdict included elements of damage attributable to
mental suffering not generally recoverable in a contract action and therefore unless
the plaintiff agreed to forego those damages, the case would have been remanded
for a new trial. Id. at 552.
27. The first case recognizing a cause of action sounding in tort from a breach
of implied contract of good faith and fair dealing was Gates v. Life of Montana
Insurance Co., 668 P.2d 213 (Mont. 1983). "Breach of the duty owed to deal fairly
and in good faith .

.

. is a tort for which punitive damages can be recovered." Id.

at 215.
28. An obvious difference between the two causes of action is the availability
of remedies.
If it is determined that an employee's discharge constitutes a breach of
contract, he is entitled only to compensatory damages, which are measured
by determining his lost wages and subtracting the amounts he earned or
could have earned with reasonable diligence. In a tort action, however, a
wrongfully discharged employee is entitled to all damages proximately caused
by the discharge, and punitive damages may be awarded.
DIsMIssAL, supra note 5, § 3.02 (footnotes omitted).
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Employee Handbooks/Statements of Policy

States differ as to whether the issuance of a policy statement
containing language to the effect that an employee cannot be terminated without any reason 29 or investigation3 o creates an employment
contract which cannot be terminated at will. Some state courts have
elevated a policy statement to a level where it becomes an implied
term of an employment contract thereby legally binding the employer. 3 This theory is based on the premise that employer statements
can create legitimate reliance and expectations on the part of employees. In addition to employee handbooks, an obligation may also be
found in application forms and by written or oral statements of the
2
employer's personnel policies.1
Traditional policy statements were not, as a matter of law, legally
binding on the employer. They were not bargained-for-consideration
and their terms and conditions typically could be freely amended or
even withdrawn by the employer.33 Even assuming that the employer's
assertion was relied on or was part of the bargain in the mind of the
employee, many courts held the employment at will relationship
preempted any terms or conditions which did not expressly alter the

agreement

4

29. For example, the handbook may provide the employee can only be terminated for good cause.
30. For example, the handbook may prescribe a grievance process to be
followed prior to the termination of an employee.
31. See supra notes 39-43.
32. See generally Decker, Handbooks and Employment PoliciesAs Express Or

Implied Guarantees Of Employment - Employer Beware!, 5 J.L. & CoM. 207 (1985).

33. McConnell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 499 So. 2d 68 (Fla. App. 1986)
("unilateral policy statements cannot, without more, give rise to enforceable contract
rights.") Id. at 69; Johnson v. National Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d
779 (1976) (unilateral expressions of company's policies and procedures were not
bargained for and therefore gratuities which could be withdrawn or amended at any
time).
34. See, e.g., McCluskey v. Unicare Health Facility, Inc., 484 So. 2d 398 (Ala.
1986) (a handbook cannot change an employment at will arrangement into one
conforming to terms and conditions contained in the handbook); Muller v. Stromberg
Carlson Corporation, 427 So. 2d 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (at-will employment
arrangement is not altered by policy statements by an employer without the parties'
explicit mutual agreement); Georgia Ports Authority v. Rogers, 327 S.E.2d 511 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1985) (employee manual was not a contract and even if it were, it was
terminable at will); Mead Johnson and Company v. Oppenheimer, 458 N.E.2d 668
(Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (employment manual cannot modify an at-will employment
relationship); Shaw v. S.S. Kresge Co., 167 Ind. App. 1, 328 N.E.2d 775 (1975)
(handbook issued at time of employee's hiring setting forth progressive system of
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Where an employment manual or policy is issued subsequent to
the commencement of the relationship, the employee cannot directly
rely on the bargained-for-consideration to support the theory that a
contract is created. Although some courts have recognized a theory
of promissory estoppel," others have held "[a]n employee handbook
distributed after the employee is hired does not become part of that
employee's contract. '3 6 In Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Company,17 a former employee brought a wrongful discharge suit alleging
the defendant's handbook issued two years after the plaintiff was
hired, required notice prior to termination. The court held,

[i]t constituted a unilateral statement of company policies and
procedures. Its terms were not bargained for, and there was
discipline did not modify employment relationship even if employee relied on its
terms); Sloan v. Taylor Machinery Company, 501 So. 2d 409 (Miss. 1987) (employee
manual provided after employment began does not make employment agreement a
written contract so as to satisfy state Statute of Frauds law); Johnson v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988) (no handbook exception to employment
at will doctrine); Edwards v. Citibank, N.A., 74 A.D.2d 553, 425 N.Y.S.2d 327,
appeal dismissed, 51 N.Y.2d 875, 414 N.E.2d 400, 433 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (1980)
(employee manual which may be unilaterally amended or withdrawn does not bind
employer to the termination terms in the manual "while leaving the employee free to
terminate his employment at any time and for any or no reason."); Griffin v.
Housing Authority, 62 N.C. App. 556, 303 S.E.2d 200 (1983) (because personnel
policies were not expressly incorporated into employee's contract, employer was not
obligated to follow); Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super.
1986) (traditional employment at will relationship is presumed absent clearly stated
intent to alter via employment manual); Reynolds Manufacturing Company v.
Mendoza, 644 S.W.2d 536 (Tex. Civ. App. 1982) (because employer could unilaterally
amend or withdraw the employee manual, the terms therein were not part of the
employment agreement).
35. The idea here is that the employee relied on the existence of the terms and
conditions provided in the manual or policy in continuing their employment and/or
in foregoing employment opportunities elsewhere. See, e.g., Schipani v. Ford Motor
Company, 102 Mich. App. 606, 302 N.W.2d 307 (1981); Grouse v. Group Health
Plan, Inc., 306 N.W.2d 114 (Minn. 1981); Bower v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 852
F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988) (applying Missouri law); Thompson v. St. Regis Paper
Company, 1020 Wash. 2d 219, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984).
36. Gates v. Life of Montana Insurance Company, 638 P.2d 1063, 1066 (Mont.
1982) (emphasis added) (citing Johnson v. National Beef Packing Company, 220
Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976)). See also Heidick v. Kent General Hospital, Inc., 446
A.2d 1095 (Del. 1982); Trought v. Richardson, 338 S.E.2d 617 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(plaintiff prevailed on claim that employment at will arrangement was modified by
employee manual only by proving her reliance on its terms and conditions at the
time of hiring).
37. 638 P.2d 1063 (Mont. 1982).
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no meeting of the minds. The policies may be changed unilaterally at any time. The employee handbook was not a part of
Gates' employment contract at the time she was hired, nor
could it have been a modification to her contract because there
was no new and independent consideration for its terms. 8
A growing number of states, however, are holding the terms and
conditions contained in an employment or policy manual can indeed
create or modify an employment at will relationship. 9 The landmark
case espousing this theory is Pine River State Bank v. Mettille.40 In
Pine River, an ex-employee alleged an employee manual distributed
subsequent to the commencement of his employment created an
enforceable contract which could only be terminated for just cause.
In that case, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined the commonly
raised objections to allowing the provisions of an employment manual
38. Jd. at 1066.
39. See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Campbell, 512 So. 2d 725 (Ala. 1987);
Leikvold v. Valley View Community Hospital, 688 P.2d 170 (Ariz. 1984) ("employer's
representations in a personnel manual can become terms of an employment contract
and can limit an employer's ability to discharge"); Wagenseller, infra note 63
(termination procedures in manual binding despite disclaimer); Walker v. Northern
San Diego County Hospital Dist. 135 Cal. App. 3d 986, 185 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1982)
(employee handbooks can alter at-will relationship); Finley v. Aetna Life & Casualty
Co., 520 A.2d 208 (Conn. 1987) (court will recognize cause of action based on breach
of terms in personnel manual); A.2d 613 (D.C. 1985) (employment manual may
modify at-will relationship is for jury to decide); Kinoshita v. Canadian Pacific
Airlines, 724 P.2d 110 (Haw. 1986) (employee handbook can create enforceable
contract relationship); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 292 N.W.2d 880 (Mich.
1980) (classic case holding handbook can modify at-will relationship); Woolley v.
Hoffman-LaRoche Inc., 491 A.2d 1257, modified, 499 A.2d 515 (N.J. 1985) (employment manual can create enforceable terms but may allow for disclaimer);
Forrester v. Parker, 606 P.2d 191 (N.M. 1980) (personnel policy controlled employeremployee relationship); Sivel v. Reader's Digest, Inc., 677 F. Supp. 183 (1988)
(applying N.Y. law) (oral assurances may alter at-will relationship); Langdon v. Saga
Corp., 569 P.2d 524 (Okla. Ct. App. 1977); Fleming v. Kids and Kin Head Start,
693 P.2d 1363 (Or. Ct. App. 1985) (handbook can change relationship from at-will
to terminable only for just cause); Benoir v. Ethan Allen, Inc. 514 A.2d 716 (Ut.
1986) (company obligated to follow procedures outlined in manual); Thompson v.
St. Regis Paper Co., 685 P.2d 1081 (Wash. 1984) (parties can implicitly agree to
modify at-will relationship through provisions in manual); Cook v. Heck's Inc., 342
S.E. 2d 453 (W. Va. 1986) (implied employment contract can arise from manual);
Ferraro v. Koelsch, 368 N.W.2d 666 (Wis. 1985) (employment relatonship can be
modifid by use of employee's handbook); Mobil Coal Producing, Inc. v. Parks, 704
P.2d 702 (Wyo. 1985) (employee handbook can set forth enforceable terms of
employment relationship).
40. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
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to alter an employment at will arrangement were not problematic. 4

The court reasoned that employers, if they so choose, may provide
additional job security to their employees even in an employment at
will setting and employment manuals are offers of employment which
an employee may choose to accept; the employee supplies the necessary consideration by remaining on the job since he or she is free to

leave. 42 Regarding the requirement of independent consideration, the
court held the rule is more one of construction than of substance
and, if the parties manifest a clear intent that their employment
arrangement will not be freely terminable by the employer, no additional consideration beyond the employee's continued performance
should be required.

43

Many courts distinguish between situations where an employee
reads and presumably accepts the terms and conditions in the employee manual, and situations where the employee has not read the

41. Three arguments were analyzed:
(1) The contract specifies no duration therefore the parties did not intend
any job termination restrictions to be binding. The court held that this
misconstrues the at will rule by attempting to make it a rule of substantive
limits to the formation of a contract rather than merely a rule of construction; it should not be necessary for an employee to prove that a contract is
permanent or for a specified duration if the parties have agreed to other
terms of employment.
(2) A provision for job security in a contract having no definite duration,
whether part of the originalemployment agreement or subsequently added,
is not binding on the employer without additional,independent consideration
other than services performed by the employee. The court struggled with
this argument but held that again this misconstrues the at will rule by
attempting to make it a substantive rule, and that the single performance
of the employee's duties may support multiple promises by the employer
including promises to provide job security.
(3) Job security agreements are lacking in enforceability for want of mutuality of obligation (i.e., the employer is bound but the employee remains
free to go wherever and whenever he wants). The court dispensed with this
argument by holding that mutuality of obligation is in actuality an inquiry
into the forbidden area of adequacy of consideration; "the concept of
mutuality in contract law has been widely discredited and the right of one
party to terminate a contract at will does not invalidate the contract."
Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 628-29 (1983).
42. Id. at 629. This represents the modern view of contract law which does
away with the strict requirement of mutuality. See, e.g.,

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF

§ 79 (1981) (where consideration is adequate, mutuality of obligation not
required to create enforceable contract).
CONTRACTS

43. Pine River State Bank, 333 N.W.2d at 629.
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manual and may not even be aware of its existence." With its decision
in Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center,45 Illinois only
recently decided the issue of whether an employment handbook or
statement of policy can modify an employment at will contract to the
extent of creating binding terms and conditions. 46
2.

Public Policy Violation Theories
This is the fastest growing and yet most amorphous exception to
47
the employment at will doctrine.
Under this theory the plaintiff generally claims the dismissal
violated a public policy expressly or impliedly set forth in a state or
federal statute or constitution. 4 Although technically considered a
tort, 49 the public policy violation theory is generally included as a

category separate from contract or tort theories because "the tortcontract division does not work well when an analysis of the 'public
policy' cases is attempted." 50
Commonly included under this general umbrella are exceptions
to the employment at will theory for: (1) "whistleblowing" employees
who allege they were terminated as a result of their actual or impending reporting to authorities of their employer's violation of laws or
regulations;" (2) employees who allege that they were dismissed
because they were exercising a statutory right 2 or complying with a
44. See, e.g., Spero v. Lockwood, Inc. 721 P.2d 174 (Idaho 1986) (manual
distributed to some employees after plaintiff's hiring did not affect relationship where
employee did not read or rely on it).
45. 115 11. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987).
46. See infra notes 93-99 & 167-79 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp., 11 I1. App. 3d 502, 444
N.E.2d 588 (1982) (plaintiff-comptroller was discharged allegedly for uncovering
financial discrepancies and in effort by corporation to avoid criminal law prosecution).
48. See generally DismssAL, supra note 5, §§ 6 & 7.
49. The Illinois Supreme Court held that punitive damages may be awarded
for a violation and has consistently referred to this as "the tort of retaliatory
discharge." Palmateer v. International Harvester Co. 85 11. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876
(1981) (emphasis added).
50. DisMissAL, supra note 5, § 4.02[2].
51. This cause of action includes but is not limited to allegations that the
employer is: (1)violating product safety requirements (see Geary v. United States
Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974)); (2) violating food and drug processing
requirements (see Kalman v. Grand Union Co., 183 N.J. Super. 153, 443 A.2d 728
(1982)); or (3) engaging in questionable financial reporting practices (see Petrik v.
Monarch Printing Corp., 111 Ill. App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982)).
52. See, e.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
See also infra notes 100-03 and accompanying text.
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statutory duty;53 and (3) employees who claim that they were discharged because they refused to violate a criminal statute." Dismissals
for alleged violations of public policy are frequently referred to as
retaliatory discharges because the employer is allegedly fighting back
or retaliating against the employee. They are considered public policy
violations because discharging an employee who, for example, calls
attention to an employer's illegal activity will supposedly dampen the
public spirit of civic-minded employees or will defeat the purpose of
the statute conferring or prohibiting the right in question.
The germinal case in the area of public policy violations is
Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters." In that case,
the plaintiff alleged his employer instructed him to give false testimony
before a legislative committee, and that he was then terminated upon
his refusal to obey. The California District Court of Appeal held the
plaintiff's complaint was sufficient to create a cause of action to
recover his accrued salary. In Petermann, the statute provided criminal
penalties for anyone perjuring himself or soliciting the commission of
perjury. 6 However, this court went the additional step of proclaiming
that "in order to more fully effectuate the state's declared policy
against perjury, the civil law [in addition to the criminal law] must
deny the employer his generally unlimited right to . . . [terminate at
will]." 5 7
Petermann has been followed in other decisions, including the
8
commonly-cited Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. In Tameny, the
California Supreme Court extended Petermann beyond the contract
cause of action and held an employer demanding or coercing commission of criminal acts "violates a basic duty imposed by law upon
all employers, and [the affected employee] may maintain a tort action
59
for wrongful discharge against his employer."

53. See, e.g., Wiskotoni v. Michigan Nat'l Bank-West, 716 F.2d 378 (6th Cir.
1983) (the employer violated public policy by discharging an employee who served
on grand jury despite employer's instructions not to serve).
54. See, e.g., Peterman v. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 174 Cal.
App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959) (a case recognizing a public policy violation where
the employer allegedly discharged an employee for refusing a directive to commit
perjury).
55. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
56. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 118 & 653(f) (West 1988).
57. Petermann, 174 Cal. App. 2d at 189, 344 P.2d at 27.
58. 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330 (1980).
59. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 178, 610 P.2d 1330,
1337 (1980) (emphasis added).
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At the other end of the spectrum is Murphy v. American Home

Products Corp.,6 where the high court in New York explicitly declined

to follow the trend started by Petermann and Tameny. It held New
York courts do not recognize a cause of action in tort for wrongful
discharge and any consideration regarding changing this law must be
given by the legislature.61 By early 1988, more than one-half of the
states had expressly recognized the public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine by either statute62 or judicial decision. 63
60. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983).
61. Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 301, 448
N.E.2d 86, 89 (1983).
ANN.

62. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.

§ 408.1065 (West 1985); WIs.

§ 440.205 (West 1979); MICH. COMP. LAWS
§§ 6.76, 12.07(1) (West 1986). See

STAT. ANN.

also infra notes 162-165 and accompanying text.

63. See Petermann and Tameny supra at notes 54 and 59. See also, Wagenseller

v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, 147 Ariz. 370, 710 P.2d 1025 (1985) (plaintiff
discharged allegedly for refusing to "moon" audience in play provides basis for
wrongful termination as violative of indecent exposure statute); Sheets v. Teddy's
Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980) (limited public policy
exception); Hansrote v. Amer Industrial Technologies, Inc., 586 F.Supp. 113 (W.D.
Pa. 1984), aff'd, 770 F.2d 1070 (1985) (applying Deleware law) (employee discharged
for refusing to participate in employer's illegal activity violated public policy); Parnar
v. Americana Hotels, Inc., 65 Haw. 370, 652 P.2d 625 (1982) (clear mandate of
public policy may be created by employer's contravention of letter or purpose of
public policies established by prior judicial decisions); Jackson v. Minidoka Irrigation
Dist., 98 Ida. 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977) (court indicated it might recognize public
policy violation claim); Kelsay v. Motorola, 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353, reh'g
denied (1979); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't of Labor Services,
6 Kan. App.2d 448, 630 P.2d 186 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing public policy
violation where employee was terminated for filing workers' compensation claim);
Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, 666 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. 1986) (court recognized
violation of "well-defined and fundamental" public policy); Siles v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433 N.E.2d 103 (Mass. Ct. App. 1982) (recognizing claim where discharge is contrary to public policy); Suchodolski v. Michigan
Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982) (public policy exception
will be recognized where employee was discharging a statutory right or duty); Phipps
v. Clark Oil & Refining Corp., 396 N.W.2d 588 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 408
N.W.2d 569 (1987) (adopted public policy exception noting claimant has burden of
proving clear mandate of public policy); Bottijliso v. Hutchison Fruit Co., 96 N.M.
789, 635 P.2d 992 (N.M. Ct. App. 1981) (recognizing public policy violation based
on fraud); Geary v. U.S. Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (recognizing
narrow public policy exception); Sabine Pilot Services, Inc. v. Hauck, 687 S.W.2d
733 (Tex. 1985) (recognizing narrow public policy exception); Pritchett v. Affinity
Mining Co., 356 S.E.2d 18 (W.Va. 1987) (employer may be liable for discharging an
employee in contravention of some substantial public policy as determined by a jury);
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (recognizing narrow public policy exception where a public policy is evidenced by constitutional or statutory provisions).
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However, in addition to New York, which continues to recognize no
64
judicially created public policy exception, a number of states recognize only a statutorily created exception; these states adhere to the
6
theory espoused in Murphy : any public policy exception to the theory
of employment at will must come from the legislature and not the
courts .66

Some courts have been reluctant to recognize a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge where the statute itself provides adequate
protection to the actual or potential whistleblowing employee. These
courts have held the statute provides the exclusive remedy in state
69
minimum wage laws, 67 in state" and federal OSHA laws, workers'
70 sex discrimination laws, 7 and age discrimination
laws,
compensation
72
laws.
64. Sabetay v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 114 A.D.2d 6, 497 N.Y.S.2d 655 (1986)
(Murphy is still the law in New York), aff'd, 69 N.Y.2d 329, 506 N.E.2d 919 (1987).
65. See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
66. See, e.g., Jones v. Ethridge, 497 So. 2d 1107 (Ala. 1986) (legislature created
statute proscribing retaliatory discharge for an employee filing workers' compensation
claim (ALA. CODE § 25-5-11.1 (1986)) and for employee serving on jury empanelled
under any federal or state statute (ALA. CODE § 12-16-8.1 (1986)); no statute addressed
situations where employee was discharged for failing to commit a criminal act and
this court upheld employer's right to terminate at will); Johnson v. McDonnell
Douglas Corp., 745 S.W.2d 661 (Mo. 1988) (no public policy exception to the
employment at will doctrine exists in the absence of a constitutional provision,
statute, or regulation); Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335
N.W.2d 834 (1983) (only actionable public policy violations are those evidenced by a
constitutional or statutory provision).
67. See, e.g., Corbin v. Sinclair Marketing, Inc., 684 P.2d 265 (Colo. Ct. App.
1984) (public policy exception not available when statute provides wrongful discharge
remedy which employee pursued).
68. See, e.g., Portillo v. G.T. Price Products, Inc., 131 Cal. App. 3d 285, 182
Cal. Rptr. 291 (1982) (statute is exclusive remedy if claim is based on violation of
the specific statute); Walsh v. Consolidated Freightways, Inc., 278 Or. 347, 563 P.2d
1205 (1977) (existing remedies sufficiently protect employees discharged for complaining about safety and health problems).
69. See, e.g., Davis v. Boise Cascade Corp., 288 N.W.2d 680 (Minn. 1979) (no
provision in OSHA for an independent private cause of action where employer
violated regulations in Act).
70. See, e.g., Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d
272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978) (remedies for violations of
the spirit of act are best left to the legislature).
71. See, e.g., Grzyb v. Evans, 700 S.W.2d 399 (Ky. 1985) (although state
recognizes public policy exception to employment at will doctrine, exclusive remedy
lies in statutes).
72. See, e.g., Mouradian v. General Electric Co., 43 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas.
(BNA) 240 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (exclusive remedy for wrongful termination based
on age is contained in statute).
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Tort Theories

Generally, tort theory is employed less frequently than either the
contract or public policy exception theories. A cause of action against
an employer arising under a tort theory claim generally takes one of
two forms: (1) "intentional infliction of emotional distress" due to
the egregious manner of handling the discharge,73 or (2) "fraud,"
where the discharged employee alleges that she acted in reliance on
the employer's promises, which were made with no intention of
fulfillment. 74 Other tort theories exist 75 and may be growing in acceptance as a cause of action by a discharged employee against his exemployer.
II.

EMPLOYMENT AT WILL IN ILLINOIS TODAY

A. CONTRACT THEORIES
1. Good Faith and Fair Dealing
Illinois courts have generally refused to allow an independent
cause of action alleging an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing in the employment agreement. Although the Illinois Supreme
Court has not specifically addressed the issue, the 1982 appellate court
decision in Martin v. Federal Life Insurance Company76 has been
followed by at least two districts considering the issue. 7 In Martin,
the plaintiff claimed he was wrongfully terminated from his job of
twenty-two years where the employee allegedly accepted the defendant's offer of lifetime employment. The offer was conditioned on
his satisfactory performance and declining an offer of employment
73. Here, the claim is that the employer's actions in discharging the employee
amounted to "extreme and outrageous conduct." See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 comment d (1965). See, e.g., Agis v. Howard Johnson Company,
371 Mass. 140, 355 N.E.2d 315 (1976) (after disappearance of food, restaurant began
firing servers in alphabetical order in hopes of revealing the thief; plaintiff successfully

sued for intentional infliction of emotional distress). See generally DISMISSAL, supra
note 5, § 4.03. But see Murphy v. American Home Products Corporation, 58 N.Y.2d
293, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983) (rejecting intentional infliction of emotional distress claim
by plaintiff-employee).

74. See generally DISMISsAL, supra note 5, at § 4.02.
75. Defamation see, DIsMIssAL, supra note 5, § 4.06; Abusive Discharge see,
DISMISSAL, supra note 5, § 4.04. See also Mullaney, Torts in the Workplace, TRIAL,
June 1989, at 40.
76. 109 Ill. App. 3d 596, 440 N.E.2d 998 (1982).
77. Disario v. Enesco Imports Corp., 165 Ill. App. 3d, 520 N.E.2d 766 (1st
Dist. 1987); Hugo v. Tomaszewski, 155 Ill. App. 3d 906, 508 N.E.2d 1139 (5th Dist.
1987).
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from a competitor. The court held "Illinois law does not recognize a
tort remedy based on an employer's 'bad faith' breach of an implied
contract covenant of fair dealing." 7 8
The later appellate court case of Hugo v. Tomaszewsk 9 supported the understanding that Illinois courts do not recognize an
independent cause of action for an employer's breach of the implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing.80 In that case, the plaintiff
had been injured on the job and pursued a workers' compensation
claim. Upon receiving medical approval to return to work, the defendant terminated the employee allegedly because of a decline in business. The appellate court considered the plaintiff's retaliatory discharge
claim81 but affirmed the trial court's striking of the plaintiff's count
alleging a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing.8 2 In so doing, this court quoted from the Illinois Supreme
Court ruling in Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.,83 which stated "the common law doctrine that an employer may discharge an employee-atwill for any reason or for no reason is still the law in Illinois, except
84
for when the discharge violates a clearly mandated public policy."
The court in Hugo declined "to create a new cause of action for atwill employees for an employer's breach of the duty of good faith
and fair dealing." 85
Yet, Illinois courts have adopted a rule requiring, as a matter of
law, that every contract includes an obligation on the parties of good
faith and fair dealing.8 6 This rule has even been applied in an
employment at will situation.8 7 This potential conflict between the

78. Martin, 109 Ill. App. 3d at 605-07, 440 N.E.2d at 1005-06.
79. 155 Ill. App. 3d 906, 508 N.E.2d 1139 (1987).
80. Hugo v. Tomaszewski, 155 Ill. App. 3d 906, 911, 508 N.E.2d 1139, 1142
(1987).
81. See supra notes 51-54 and accompanying text.
82. Hugo, 155 Ill. App. 3d 906, 911-12, 508 N.E.2d 1139, 1142.
83. 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985).
84. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 525, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1356
(1985).
85. Hugo, 155 Ill. App. 3d at 911, 508 N.E.2d at 1142.
86. Dayan v. McDonald's Corp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 972, 466 N.E.2d 958 (1984),
cert. denied; Criscione v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 66 Ill. App. 3d 664, 384 N.E.2d 91
(1978).
87. Cuerton v. Abbott Laboratories, Inc., 111 I1l. App. 3d 261, 443 N.E.2d
1069 (1982) (plaintiff was a discharged employee who had been ill during his
employment and was left with unpaid medical bills as a result of employer's
cancellation of medical insurance; the court recognized a legal duty of good faith
and fair dealing in this employment at will situation but dismissed plaintiff's complaint
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refusal to recognize an independent cause of action and the recognition
that every contract include the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing has been clarified by Gordon v. Matthew Bender & Company,
Inc."s In Gordon, a terminated at will employee had been employed
by the defendant for seven years as a book salesman. The plaintiff
alleged inter alia, that the defendant deliberately made his working
life miserable by reducing his territory while maintaining his same
sales goals and promising to fire him if the same sales were not
generated. He sued the defendant under both tort and contract
theories for its breach of an sued the defendant under both tort and
contract theories for its breach of an implied-in-law duty to deal with
the plaintiff in good faith.8 9 The court rejected the plaintiff's assertion
that this obligation creates an independent cause of action and held
"the principle of performance in good faith comes into play in
defining and modifying duties which grow out of specific contract
terms and obligations. It is a derivation principle." 9 Illinois courts
have explicitly embraced the Gordon principle in Powers v. Delnor
Hospital" and Alderman Drugs v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Com92

pany.

as failing to state a cause of action). Cf. King v. Telesphere International, Inc., 632
F. Supp. 981 (N.D. I11.
1986). This case is sometimes pointed to as an exception or
a weakening of the position expressed in Hugo and Barr (dismissed employee filed
EEOC claim and was not given reason for her termination by employer; the trial
court denied motion for summary judgment by defendant and held that "the exercise
of good faith and fair dealing [is] read into every Illinois contract.") Id. at 984.
However, King is distinguishable in that the plaintiff and defendant had an express
employment contract and the plaintiff was not an at-will employee.
88. 562 F. Supp. 1286 (applying Illinois Law) (N.D. Ill. 1983).
89. Id. at 1288.
90. Id. at 1289. The Court later cites Murphy v. American Home Products
Corporation, 58 N.Y.2d 293, 461 N.Y.S.2d 232, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983) for the same
proposition. In Murphy, the plaintiff, age 59, was released allegedly due to his
disclosure to top management of improper accounting personnel practices and because
of his age; the New York high court declined to recognize an implied contractual
obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
91. 135 Ill. App. 3d 317, 321-22, 481 N.E.2d 968, 972 (1985) (action for
wrongful discharge of an at-will employee holding "the duty of good faith and fair
dealing which the law implies does not create an independent cause of action [citation]
and certainly cannot be interpreted to limit the right to terminate an at-will employment contract.").
92. 161 I11.
App. 3d 783, 790, 515 N.E.2d 689, 694 (1987) (conventional contract
case holding terminable at will employees "who allege that they have been terminated
in 'bad faith' cannot base a cause of action on a violation of the good faith and fair
dealing covenant"). "No Illinois court .. . has recognized a separate tort cause of
action premised on a violation of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing." Id. n.l.
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Employee Handbooks/Statements of Policy

In the 1987 case of Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital
Center,93 the Illinois Supreme Court took a step in eroding the doctrine
of employment at will. In Duldulao, the plaintiff was discharged
contrary to the terms and conditions contained in an employee
handbook issued by the defendant-hospital. The hospital published a
94
handbook prior to the plaintiff's date of hire in 1970; however, the
plaintiff did not discuss the contents of the handbook at the time she
participated in her employment interview. 95 In 1975 and in 1981, the
hospital revised its handbook to articulate the employees' rights and
duties vis-a-vis the hospital. Among other things, the revised hand96
book provided that "[plermanent [as opposed to probationary ]
employees could be terminated only with 'proper notice and investigation' [and] permanent employees are never dismissed without prior
written admonitions and/or ... [properly documented] investigation .... ,,97
In Duldulao, the Illinois Supreme Court followed the reasoning
98
and decision of Pine River State Bank v. Mettille. Duldulao held
''an employee handbook or other policy statement creates enforceable
contractual rights" provided the following requirements are met:
First, the language of the policy statement must contain a
promise clear enough that an employee would reasonably
believe that an offer has been made. Second, the statement
must be disseminated to the employee in such a manner that
the employee is aware of its contents and reasonably believes
it to be an offer. Third, the employee must accept the offer
by commencing or continuing to work after learning of the
93. 115 Il.2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987). Prior to Duldulao, Illinois appellate
courts addressed the employee handbook issue with conflicting results. Kaiser v.
Dixon, 127 Ill. App. 3d 251, 468 N.E.2d 822 (1984) (employee manual may be
binding even if not bargained for); Sargent v. Illinois Institute of Technology, 78 Ill.
App. 3d 117, 397 N.E.2d 443 (1979) (handbook not binding if not bargained for);
Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency, 24 Ill. App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d
574 (1974) (manual can create enforceable rights).
94. Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center 115 111. 2d 482, 485,
505 N.E.2d 314, 316 (1987).
2d at 485, 505 N.E.2d at 316.
95. Duldulao, 115 Ill.
96. Under the revised handbook, probationary employees could be terminated
only for just cause but without the notice required by the previous manual. Id.
97. Id.
98. 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying
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policy statement. When these conditions are present, then the
employee's continued work constitutes consideration for the
promises contained in the statement, and under traditional
principles a valid contract is formed. 99
3.

Public Policy Violation Theories

Illinois has joined those states steadily eroding any remnants of
the employment at will theory by recognizing the public policy exception to the doctrine. The exception was first recognized in the 1978
case of Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.' °° where the plaintiff claimed she
was fired in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim.
Motorola indicated they would "more than adequately" compensate
Kelsay for the injury to her thumb and she was requested not to file
a claim. 0 1 The plaintiff did pursue a workers' compensation claim
and the company subsequently terminated her. The Illinois Supreme
Court considered whether Illinois should recognize a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge and, if so, whether punitive damages could
be awarded in such an action. The court answered both questions in
the affirmative. 102 Justice Ryan, writing for the majority, stated the
purpose of the Act was to provide protection and remedies to employees via a nofault but limited award system and that "this scheme
would be seriously undermined if employers were permitted to abuse
their power to terminate by threatening to discharge employees seeking
compensation under the Act."103
A problem with the Kelsay decision is not with the legitimate
relief it affords employees terminated for exercising their legal right
to file a workers' compensation claim. Rather, the difficulty is that
little guidance was provided as to when an employer may be faced
99. Duldulao, 115 111. 2d at 490, 505 N.E.2d at 318.
100. 74 11. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978), reh'g denied (1979).
101. Kelsay, 74 111. 2d at 179, 384 N.E.2d at 356. See generally Love, Retaliatory
Dischargefor Filing a Workers' Compensation Claim: The Development of a Modern
Tort Action, 37 HASTINGS L.J. 551 (1986) (discussing contours, elements, defenses

and remedies for retaliatory discharge actions especially as they relate to workers'
compensation claimants).
102. Although the court held that punitive damages would be allowed in
subsequent retaliatory discharge cases, it struck the appellate court award of punitive

damages in this case. The court found that in addition to functioning as a punishment,
such awards are designed to be a warning or deterrent and that the defendant could
not have reasonably concluded that its liability potentially included a punitive award.

Kelsay, 74 11. 2d at 186-90, 384 N.E.2d at 359-61.
103. Id. at 182, 384 N.E.2d at 357.
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with not only compensatory, but also exemplary damages,'4 in a

situation where an employee who had filed a workers' compensation

claim is dismissed at some subsequent time. 0 5 Similarly, no indication

was given that this decision would be narrowly applied only to
discharges involving workers' compensation claims, or if it would be
expanded to other areas deemed by the court to be violative of public
policy. Although the Illinois appellate courts attempted to restrict this
ruling to workers' compensation cases,' °6 the Illinois Supreme Court

ideas, as evidenced in Palmateerv. InternationalHarvester
had 0other
7
Co.1 In Palmateer, the court expanded its holding in Kelsay to any
situation where the employee is discharged in retaliation for her
activities where the discharge is "in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy." 0
In Palmateer, the plaintiff was allegedly discharged because he

agreed to assist in a criminal investigation into the activities of a

fellow employee. The court concluded that for the purpose of protecting society's interest, the employee must be protected from employers who engage in retaliatory discharges offensive to this clear
mandate of public policy. Unfortunately, as the court noted, "the
Achilles heel of the principle lies in the definition of public policy"' 1 9

a term for which "It]here is no precise definition."" 0 The majority
in this 5-4 decision did, however, determine that "[t]here is no public
policy more important or more fundamental than the one favoring
the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens,""' and

104. See supra note 49.
105. For example, the Kelsay decision did not indicate whether employer liability
would be limited to situations where a present employee was dismissed for filing a
workers' compensation claim or whether liability would extend to a situation where
an employer refuses to hire an individual who had filed a claim with her previous
employer. See Darnell v. Impact Industries, 105 11.2d 158, 473 N.E.2d 935 (1984)
(recognizing this cause of action).
App. 3d 994, 411 N.E.2d
106. See, e.g., Rozier v. St. Mary's Hospital 88 I11.
50 (1980). "Kelsay was a decision of narrow applicability intended only to promote
the public policy furthered by the Workmen's Compensation Act. Few, if any,
considerations of public policy justify a deviation from the employer's general
privilege to fire an at-will employee, with or without just cause." Id. at 998, 411
N.E.2d at 53.
107. 85 111.2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
2d 124, 134, 421 N.E.2d
108. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.
876, 881 (1981).
109. Id.at 130, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
110. Id.
111. Id.at 132, 421 N.E.2d at 879.
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thereby found for the plaintiff." 2 Interestingly, Justice Ryan, who
penned the majority opinion in Kelsay," a dissented in Palmateer,
objecting to the broad extension of the cause of action for retaliatory
discharge into "the nebulous area of judicially created public policy
....
4 He noted that in Kelsay, the legislature had clearly established a public policy, but in Palmateer, "the public policy supporting
the cause of action cannot be found in any expression of the legislature, but only in the vague belief that public policy requires that we
all become 'citizen crime-fighters.' "I"
The Illinois Supreme Court subsequently expanded the public
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. In Wheeler v.
CaterpillarTractor Co.," 6 the court upheld a cause of action brought

by a nuclear worker discharged for refusing to work under allegedly
unsafe conditions. This case liberalized the public policy exception
once again via two avenues. First, the plaintiff had federal remedies
available under the applicable statute regulating the industry." 7 Yet
the court held the plaintiff could not only bring a separate private
cause of action in conjunction with filing a claim with the appropriate
federal authorities, but could even bring this action if no other
complaint was made."' Second, the court held the defendant engaged
in a retaliatory discharge in violation of the clearly mandated public
policy of protecting the lives and property of citizens from the hazards
of radioactivity despite the fact that the plaintiff was discharged solely
112. As in Kelsay, the court in Palmateerawarded no punitive damages. Because
the court in Kelsay allowed punitive damages only in future cases, the defendant
company's liability in Palmateerdid not include punitive damages since the plaintiff
was discharged 14 months prior to the decision in Kelsay. Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 135, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881 (1981).
113. See supra notes 100-105 and accompanying text.
114. Palmateer, 85 Ill. 2d at 136, 421 N.E.2d at 881 (Ryan, J. dissenting).
115. Id.
116. 108 Ill. 2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).

117. Energy Reorganization Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. § 5851 (1982).
(a) No employer ... . may discharge any employee ...

because the employee

...(1) commenced, caused to be commenced, or is about to commence or
cause to be commenced a proceeding under this chapter or the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended [42 U.S.C. 2011 et. seq.] ....
(b)(2)(B) If [as a result of the employee's complaint, it is determined that]

a violation ...

Id.

has occurred [the employee may be entitled to reinstatement]

to his former position together with the compensation (including back pay),
terms, conditions, and privileges of his employment, and [compensatory
damages].
118. Wheeler, 108 Ill. 2d at 510, 485 N.E.2d at 376.
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for engaging in an internal complaint process with his employer. That
is, based on this holding, the public policy violation exception to the
employment at will doctrine may be invoked even if no report to any
outside agency or organization is involved.
19
the Illinois Supreme Court
In Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co.,
attempted to clarify what constitutes a "clearly mandated public
policy," and thereby control the growth of this exception to the
employment at will doctrine. The effect of Barr has probably been to
accomplish neither. In Barr, the plaintiffs were construction foremen
who were discharged after they allegedly intimidated fellow employees.
The foremen claimed they were denied their rights of free speech, due
process, and equal protection and, therefore, that their discharge was
in contravention of a clearly mandated public policy as promulgated
2
in the United States 120 and Illinois' ' constitutions. The court in Barr
found against the plaintiffs, holding that the cited constitutional
provisions restrict the power of the government and not private
individuals.122 The court went on to reiterate the same criteria on
which a discharged plaintiff may base a cause of action for retaliatory
must be in contravention of a clearly
discharge-the termination
23
1
policy.
mandated public
Thus, the Barr opinion apparently provided some effect on the
24
Still, little guidance is
rapidly expanding public policy exception.
119. 106 Ill. 2d 520, 478 N.E.2d 1354 (1985).

120. U.S. CONST. amends. I, V, and XIV.
121. ILL. CONST. art. I, §§ 2 & 4.
122. Barr v. Kelso-Burnett Co., 106 Ill. 2d 520, 528, 478 N.E.2d 1354, 1357

(1985).
123. Id. at 529, 478 N.E.2d at 1358 (emphasis added).
124. See, e.g., Buechele v. St. Mary's Hospital Decatur, 156 Il1.App. 3d 637,
509 N.E.2d 744 (1987) (plaintiff was discharged after filing a lawsuit against her
employer for tort damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress and
defamation; the court held that such a lawsuit involved only personal rights and that
no clearly mandated public policy was involved); Zaniecki v. P.A. Bergner & Co.,
143 11.App. 3d 668, 493 N.E.2d 419 (1986) (plaintiff was discharged for reporting
personal use of scrap wood by manager to security personnel; the court held this was
purely a private rather than a public policy issue); Pratt v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
149 Ill. App. 3d, 500 N.E.2d 1001 (1986) (plaintiff was discharged for refusing to
sign statements that disavowed knowledge of his employer's violation of federal
Foreign Corrupt Practices and Export Administration Acts; the court held that this
dispute involved a private concern between the ex-employee and his employer rather
than a public policy violation and distinguished Wheeler on the grounds that the
issue in that case involved danger to the citizens of Illinois); Petrik v. Monarch
Printing Corp., 143 I11.App. 3d 1, 493 N.E.2d 616 (1986) (plaintiff was an accountant
discharged after reporting financial discrepancies to upper management but did not

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 9

provided to protect employers from a vindictive employee in a situation where previously, the two parties engaged in a dispute which
could have, by some interpretation, involved a public interest. A
charting of these and other holdings by the Illinois Supreme Court
deciding plaintiffs' rights under the public policy exception available
to at-will employees reveals a great deal of expanding of the exception 25
and relatively little retrenching or clarification of the requirements for
invoking the exception.

III.

ANALYSIS

In the last ten years, the Illinois Supreme Court has significantly
eroded the traditional doctrine of employment at will. Rather than
balancing the interests of the employer, the employee, and society,
the tide has turned in favor of the employee at the immediate expense
of the employer, and the eventual expense of society. The extent of
this transfer of power is that the interests of society may not be served
when the owner of a business cannot efficiently and profitably operate
his or her organization without extensive and expanding interference
by the judicial branch of state government. Exacerbating this problem
is the lack of direction or indication of future requirements to which
the employer must adhere in order to abide by the law.
By way of judicial activism, Illinois has created exceptions to the
doctrine of employment at will in the major areas of: (1) public policy
violations/retaliatory discharges; and (2) employee manuals/stateshow any evidence of tax evasion or misuse of corporate funds; the court held that

the absence of proof of criminal violations distinguished this situation from "citizen
crime fighter" cases and, therefore, this constituted a private rather than public
policy dispute); Cosentino v. Price, 136 Ill. App. 3d 490, 483 N.E.2d 297 (1985)
(plaintiff was discharged following his filing of a grievance under a collective

bargaining agreement; the court held that this was a private matter and no clearly
mandated public policy was involved).
125. See Hinthorn v. Roland's of Bloomington, 119 Ill. 2d 526, 519 N.E.2d 909

(1988) (plaintiff who had filed numerous workers' compensation claims due to workrelated injury was directed to, and did, sign a "voluntary resignation"; although not
addressing the issue of "constructive discharge," the court held a forced signing of
a resignation constituted an actual discharge from employment and thereby the public
policy violation claim was allowed); Darnell v. Impact Industries, 105 Ill. 2d 158,

473 N.E.2d 935 (1984) (public policy violation exception extended to retaliatory
discharge of new employee for filing workers' compensation claim against prior
employer); Midgett v. Sackett-Chicago, Inc., 105 Ill. 2d 143, 473 N.E.2d 1280 (1984),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 909 (1985) (public policy violation exception extended to
include union employees without requiring the discharged employee to exhaust all

remedies provided under the collective bargaining agreement).
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ments of policy. The exception of the implied covenant of good faith
and fair dealing has not been explicitly rejected or accepted by the
Illinois Supreme Court and has received attention only by the appellate
courts of the state. 126 This expansionism of employee rights comes at
a time when Illinois, long considered a strong industrial state, is losing
employers-along with their tax dollars-to states with laws more
127
conducive to profitably operating a business.
Overall, the doctrine of employment at will is fair to all parties
involved. Freedom to contract is an inherent right which should not
be impinged with respect to employer or employee. The meaning of
"employment at will" should be clear to both parties. Its simple
essence should be obvious to the employee in that just as he is free
to walk away from the employer at any time and for any reason, the
128
employer is free to discharge the employee under the same terms.
If the employee desires a more structured relationship, the parties'
relative worth will dictate the terms of the arrangement. "So long as
it is accepted that the employer is the full owner of his capital and
the employee is the full owner of his labor, the two are free to
exchange on whatever terms and conditions they see fit .. "129
To be sure, there are situations where the employer should be
subject to scrutiny. Examples of these are where the clear mandate of
public policy is violated or where force or fraud is employed in
contractual negotiations. 30 However, occurrences of these incidents
are sufficiently infrequent so as not to justify limiting the freedom of
parties to enter into contracts.'
126. See supra notes 76 & 77 and accompanying text.
127. See Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d
876 (1981) (Ryan, J.dissenting). "The deteriorating business climate in this State is

a topic of substantial interest . .. industries are leaving the State at a troublesome
rate ... this court should [not] further contribute to the declining business environment by creating a vague concept of public policy .... " Id. at 143, 421 N.E.2d at

885.

128. Subject to proscriptions against acting in an unlawfully discriminatory
manner. See supra notes 21 and 22.
129. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CI. L. REV. 947, 955

(1984) (hereinafter Epstein). But see Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual
Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV.

1404, 1405 (1967) (employees are limited in their job mobility and therefore are
vulnerable to employer pressures).

130. See generally Epstein, Unconscionability:A CriticalReappraisal, 18 J.L. &

EcoN. 293 (1975).
131. Epstein, supra note 129, at 954-55. "The strength of the contract at will
should not be judged by the occasional cases in which it is said to produce unfortunate
results, but rather by the vast run of cases where it provides a sensible private
response to the many and varied problems in labor contracting." Id. at 982.
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No suggestion is made here that Illinois take steps to repress the
employee or to subordinate her interests to the point she cannot earn
a decent wage and enjoy reasonable working conditions. However,
that protection for the worker must be created with careful and wellreasoned consideration for all interests concerned. This is best done
by letting the employer operate her business with the least possible
interference. Additionally, where regulation in areas such as retaliatory discharge is perceived as necessary, it should emanate from the
legislature which is a forum designed for hearing, considering, and
balancing all affected interests. Finally, employers should be free to
use handbooks and expressions of policy as methods of communication to employees without having to be concerned about creating a
contractual obligation.
A.

ALL INTERESTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED AND PROTECTED

The legitimate interests of an employer in operating her business
without external interference should not be impaired without consideration of the interests of all involved or potentially affected. Broadly,
three interests are present. First, the interest of the employee in his
livelihood exists. Second, the interest of society is present in seeing:
(1) viable businesses remain to provide jobs, taxes, etc.; (2) individual
members of society employed in a setting which allows them to earn
a reasonable living, purchase goods and services, pay their debts, and
enjoy a comfortable life; and (3) its public policies respected and
carried out. Third, and sometimes overlooked is the interest of the
employer in maintaining a thriving, profitable business organization.
These three interests must be balanced. This idea was even
recognized in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,'3 2 which is considered the
earliest and perhaps most liberal application of the public policy
exception. Although it held that termination of an employee where
the discharge is motivated by bad faith or based on retaliation
constitutes a public policy violation, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court admitted: "[in all employment contracts, . . . the employer's
interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced against
the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and the
public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two."'3
132. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
133. Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 133, 316 A.2d 549, 551 (1974).
At least one court has gone so far as to construe the decision in Monge as creating
a "just cause" contract out of a conventional terminable at will arrangement. Daniel
v. Magma Copper Co., 127 Ariz. 320, 324, 620 P.2d 699, 703 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980).
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To allow one interest to dominate at the expense of the others will
adversely affect all three; although they are separable and distinct,
they are really in effect one and the same. If the rights and interests
of employees overshadow those of the employer, the business fails
with the result that the employer, the employee and society all come
out losers. This concept was well summarized in an early wrongful
discharge case where the court said: "the employer's legitimate interest
in conducting his business and employing and retaining the best
personnel available cannot be unjustifiably impaired.' ' 34 "[A]s far as
an employment relationship is concerned, an employer as well as an
employee has rights . . . . " As poignantly noted by dissenting Justice
Ryan in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 36 the courts, in
departing from the general rule of employment at will, should not
concentrate solely on the expectations of the employee in continuing
his employment. Rather, "[tihe legitimate interest of the employer in
guiding the policies and destiny of his operation cannot be ignored
...[and therefore the] courts must balance the interests of employee
that will accomand employer with the hope of fashioning a remedy
37
modate the legitimate expectations of both."
Any attempts to prevent employer abuses, while ostensibly benefiting the employee, have an economic impact on the employer; even
when no potential employee abuse exists, the employer must consider
the various constraints along with their potentially severe impact.
Courts not following Monge and its progeny have noted the potential
134. Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 166 N.J. Super 335, 341, 399 A.2d
1023, 1026 (1979).
135. Percival v. General Motors Corp., 539 F.2d 1126, 1130 (1976).
136. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 142, 421 N.E.2d 876, 884 (1981) (Underwood, Ryan and
Moran, JJ., dissenting). See infra notes 157 & 158 and accompanying text.
137. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 Ill. 2d 124, 142-43, 421 N.E.2d
876, 884 (1981) (Underwood and Ryan, JJ., dissenting). See also Brockmeyer v. Dun
& Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983). The Court in Brockmeyer
recognized the employer's interests in stating:
We believe that the adoption of a narrowly circumscribed public policy
exception properly balances the interests of employees, employers and the
public. Employee job security interests are safeguarded against employer
actions that undermine fundamental policy preferences. Employers retain
sufficient flexibility to make needed personnel decisions in order to adapt
to changing economic conditions. Society also benefits ...

in a number of

ways. A more stable job market is achieved. Well-established public policies
are advanced. Finally, the public is protected against frivolous lawsuits since
courts will be able to screen cases .

.

. if the discharged employee cannot

allege a clear expression of public policy.
Id. at 569, 335 N.W.2d at 841.
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adverse impact of liberally allowing public policy violation lawsuits:
"[tihe everpresent threat of suit might well inhibit the making of
critical judgments by employers concerning employee qualifications."' 38 Additional difficulties arise if employers are no longer free
to terminate at will. For example, if it is improper to dismiss an
employee at the will of the employer, then it will likewise become
improper to transfer or demote at will since the employee may be
able to legitimately assert a claim of constructive dismissal. "[A] rule
that starts with modest ambitions will in the end regulate each and
every aspect of the employment relationship."' 3 9 The result is, with
reference to employment decisions, the employer is no longer running
the business, but his "partners" now include the legislature and the
judiciary.
An advantage accruing to the employee in an environment where
potential litigation is not facing the employer who terminates a
relationship is the increased willingness to take a greater risk in his
hiring decision. An employer will be less likely to take a chance on
an unproven or "tainted" employee if he knows that the possibility
for a costly lawsuit might result if his hunch proves wrong and the
employee must be terminated. "Where an employer might have been
more willing to take risky employees under an at-will rule, he will
now be less willing to do so under ... [a dilution of the employment
at will doctrine such that it becomes a 'for-cause' rule] because any
subsequent demotion or dismissal will be an open invitation to a
lawsuit by an aggrieved employee."' 14
B.

THE LEGISLATURE SHOULD PROVIDE SOLE BASIS FOR PUBLIC
POLICY EXCEPTIONS

Only an ardent supporter of the pure common law doctrine of
employment at will would condone the discharge of a worker where
the employee failed to follow his employer's demands that he either
do or not do something obviously against a clearly mandated public
policy.' 4' This would subordinate the valid interests of society in
138. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 319 A.2d 174, 179, 456 Pa. 171, 18182 (1974).
139. Epstein, supra note 129, at 972.
140. Id.
141. "I write no brief for an employer who tells an industrially injured employee
that [he or she] will be discharged if a claim for [worker's] compensation is filed."
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 190, 384 N.E.2d 353, 361 (1978) (Underwood,
J. dissenting in part), reh'g denied, (1979). Justice Underwood went on to state that
he believes the legislature and not the courts should decide if such a cause of action
exists. Id.
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seeing public policies are respected and fostered. The difficulty in this
statement is that two nebulous but critical factors must be addressed.
First, who is to declare this amorphous "public policy" and second,
what constitutes clearly mandated public policy? Put another way,
what should be the role of the courts vis-t-vis the legislature in
defending society's rights in this area? These questions presuppose
the desirability of the legislature creating the laws protecting public
policies and the courts interpreting and enforcing this legislation. But
what happens when the legislature fails to speak or when it fails to
assert a clear mandate of public policy? At such time, the court is
the legislature to
essentially faced with two choices: it can wait for
43
42 or it can create its own law on the subject.
act
In the long run, it is suggested here that the former approach is
preferable for two major reasons. First, courts lack the ability, or at
least do not indicate a willingness, to promulgate a law reaching
comprehensive, definitive protection of a clearly mandated public
policy. This is actually the problem many courts are experiencing with
legislative efforts of an all-encompassing attempt to guard the integrity
of public policy; the resultant statute simply lacks the clear mandate.
The New York court deciding Murphy v. American Home Products
Corp.'" accurately reasoned that the states which have recognized the
tort of retaliatory discharge were probably motivated by the conception that the theory of freedom of contract which supported the
doctrine of employment at will has become outdated and today's45
himself.
worker does not have adequate bargaining power to protect
This court properly resisted the temptation to decide this issue.
Whether these conclusions are supportable or whether for
other compelling reasons employers should, as a matter of
policy, be held liable to at-will employees discharged in circumstances for which no liability has existed at common law,
are issues better left to resolution at the hands of the Legislature. In addition to the fundamental question whether such
liability should be recognized in New York, of no less practical
importance is the definition of its configuration if it is to be

recognized.

146

142. See supra notes 60-62 and 64-66 and accompanying text.
143. See supra notes 58-59 and 63 and accompanying text.
144. 58 N.Y.2d 293, 448 N.E.2d 86 (1983).

145. Murphy v. American Home Products Corp., 58 N.Y.2d 293, 301, 448
N.E.2d 86, 89 (1983).
146. Id. (emphasis added). See also Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Brant, 489
N.E.2d 933 (1986) (revision or rejection of at-will rule is better left to legislature).
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Although most courts generally look for some indication from
the legislature of an intent to create a protected public interest or

policy, 147 this has been taken to the next step by California in Dabbs
v. CardiopulmonaryManagement. 4 Here the appellate court flatly

rejected any suggestion that it must find statutory support for a public
policy claim to find the plaintiff had a cause of action against her exemployer on this issue. The employee was discharged after she left

her hospital post as a respiratory therapist having asserted a lack of

qualified personnel to staff the needs of the patients. In her lawsuit,
she claimed she was discharged for refusing to work under conditions
that "violate fundamental public policy of the State of California.' ' 14 9

The problem in allowing claims such as the one found in Dabbs where
a cause of action is allowed for termination in violation of some
general or "fundamental" public policy is that it provides no guidance
for future court decisions. As a result, employers have no way to

guard against violations.

The second reason supporting the proposition that any protection
of public policy should emanate from the legislature is that historically, this is the forum best designed to hear, ponder, and weigh all

of the competing interests affecting the issue under consideration.
Courts, on the other hand, are designed primarily 5o to hear the claims

and interests of the two specific adversary parties engaged in the

instant dispute. "[C]ourts could be left to perform the function, for

which they are well suited, of giving reasoned elaboration to a broad

statutory provision."

'5

147. See, e.g., Turner v. Letter Kenny Federal Credit Union, 505 A.2d 259
(1985) (clear public mandate is required in order to overcome employment at will
doctrine).
148. 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 234 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1987).
149. Dabbs v. Cardiopulmonary Management, 188 Cal. App. 3d 1437, 234 Cal.
Rptr. 129 (1987).
150. Opportunities do exist for general policy arguments along with amicus
curiae briefs; but the primary intent of a court is to resolve the instant dispute while
the legislature's primary purpose in passing a statute is to provide a regulation
governing the future actions of the populace.
151. L. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404, 1432-33 (1967)
(suggesting a legislative definition of proscribed wrongs by employers). See also
Brockmeyer v. Dun & Bradstreet, 113 Wis. 2d 561, 335 N.W.2d 834 (1983) (Day, J.
concurring). "I would leave working out wrongful discharge rights to specific legislation covering that field and defining penalties for violation. The legislature has the
advantage of being able to hold hearings, conduct investigations and determine if
there are further rights that need to be created to protect the 'at-will' employee." Id.
at 581, 335 N.W.2d at 844 (1983) (emphasis added).
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These concerns are aptly expressed in the dissents in both Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc.12 and the later case of Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co. 53 In Kelsay, Justice Underwood stated his belief that
it is improper for the courts to substitute its judgment for that of the
Illinois General Assembly. "It is essential to a preservation of the
separation of powers that those of us who serve in the judicial branch
subordinate our desires and preferences to the actions of the legislative

and executive branches

. . . .

114

He further noted, "it is not our

function to engraft on a statute additions which we think the legislature logically might or should have made."' Justice Underwood
concluded it is possible to interpret Kelsay as conferring tenure upon
any employee who has filed a workers' compensation claim against
his employer.
Henceforth, no matter how indolent, insubordinate or obnoxious an employee may be, if he has filed a compensation claim
against an employer, that employer may thereafter discharge
him only at the risk of being compelled to defend a suit for
retaliatory discharge and unlimited punitive damages, which
could well severely impair or destroy the solvency of small
56
businesses. 1
In Palmateer,Justice Underwood referred to his dissent in Kelsay and
joined Justice Ryan's comments which essentially took issue with the
idea of judicially created public policy. Justice Ryan suggested the
discharged employee should be allowed to maintain a cause of action
for retaliatory discharge only when the discharge "has been violative
of some strong public policy that has been clearly articulated ...
57 Justice Ryan
[such as that] ... found in legislative enactment."'
additionally noted the importance of recognizing and respecting the
58
employer's rights and interests in addition to those of the employee.'
2d 172, 190-98, 384 N.E.2d 353, 361-65 (1978) (Underwood, J.
152. 74 I11.
dissenting in part).
153. 85 11.2d 124, 135-45, 421 N.E.2d 876, 881-86 (1981) (Underwood, Ryan
and Moran, JJ. dissenting). See infra notes 157-158 and accompanying text.
154. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172, 191, 384 N.E.2d 353, 361 (1978)
(Underwood, J., dissenting in part).
155. Id. (quoting United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 605 (1941)).
156. Id. at 192, 384 N.E.2d at 362 (Underwood, J., dissenting in part).
2d 124, 145, 421 N.E.2d
157. Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 I11.
876, 885-86 (Underwood, Ryan and Moran, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
158. Id. at 142-43, 421 N.E.2d at 884 (Underwood, Ryan and Moran, JJ.,
dissenting). See generally section III. A. of this Comment.
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Subsequent to these two decisions, the concerns expressed by the
dissenters have materialized in other Illinois decisions judicially expanding the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine
including Petrik v. Monarch Printing Corp.'5 9 and Wheeler v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.' 6o In Petrik, the comptroller uncovered significant
discrepancies in the company's financial records and was discharged
allegedly in direct retaliation for his efforts to bring the possible
embezzlement to the attention of top management. At no time did
Petrik contact public authorities, and yet this Illinois court found
that, because criminal laws forbidding this allegedly illegal activity
were involved, "the public policy considerations that underlie Palmateer also support Petrik's conduct.' ' 6' In the 1985 case of Wheeler,
the Illinois Supreme Court broadened the scope of Palmateer and
Kelsay. The court held that as a result of comprehensive legislation,
the United States Congress in essence created a clearly mandated
public policy which allowed Wheeler to create a cause of action where
he was discharged for his refusal to work in what he asserted to be
an unsafe part of an x-ray department. At no time did Wheeler
complain to outside authorities and yet the Illinois Supreme Court
found Wheeler's internal complaint was sufficient to invoke a public
policy exception to the employment at will doctrine.
Illinois is not lacking in laws setting forth public policies and
protection from unjust discrimination and discharge. There are several
laws to guide the judiciary. For example, the Illinois General Assembly
has provided such a comprehensive law in the Illinois Human Rights
Act.162 Contained in this act are provisions to protect individuals from
discrimination in the employment setting,' 63 an expression of a clear
mandate of public policy,' 64 and a prescribed procedure for adjudication of claims. 165

159. 111 I11.
App. 3d 502, 444 N.E.2d 588 (1982).
160. 108 Ill.2d 502, 485 N.E.2d 372 (1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1122 (1986).
161. Petrik, 111 Ill.
App. 3d at 508, 444 N.E.2d at 592.
162. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, paras. 1-101 to 2-105 (1987).
163. Id. paras. 2-101 to 2-105.
164. Id.para. 1-102.
165. Id. paras. 8-101 to 8-111. See Loyola University of Chicago v. Illinois
Human Rights Comm'n, 149 I11.
App. 3d 8, 500 N.E.2d 639 (1986) (judicial review
of provisions of Act to be held in accordance with provisions of Administrative
Review Act [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 8-111(A) (1985)]); See also Ring v. R. J.
Reynolds Industries, Inc., 597 F. Supp. 1277 (1984) (IHRA provides for extensive
administrative review prior to filing a lawsuit [ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 68, para. 8-111(D)
(1985)] and no lawsuit may be brought until these remedies are exhausted).
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HANDBOOKS AND EXPRESSIONS OF POLICY SHOULD NOT
CREATE A CONTRACTUAL OBLIGATION

In deciding Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the theory that an employment at will arrangement may be altered by the issuance of an
employee manual or other expression of policy. As a result, the
court has imposed yet another burden on the employer and provides
one more block over which he must either climb or stumble.
A result of the Duldulao ruling could be that employers will
resist the publication and distribution of employee manuals in
apprehension of future consequences or ramifications. 167 An employer's decision not to communicate policies, procedures, rules and
practices would detrimentally affect the employer and the employees. The result would be the reduction in efficiency of the operation
with the ultimate loss inhering to society. 16 1 "Handbooks and employment policies usually outline: (1) rules of expected employee
behavior; (2) disciplinary or termination procedures if those rules
are violated; (3) compensation; and (4) benefit[s] .... ''169 A system
of rules is a prerequisite for the orderly and efficient functioning
of employees. 70 While important for all organizations, the significance of employee handbooks increases with the size of the enterprise. Frequently, especially in larger organizations, an employee
manual is the only accurate source of the employer's policies. If
employers elect not to distribute employee handbooks, direction
and information must be conveyed from management to employees
via verbal methods which have the potential for misinterpretation
and inconsistency. 71 Additionally, fair application of rules and
166

166. 115 Ill. 2d 482, 505 N.E.2d 314 (1987). See supra notes 93-99 and accompanying text.

167. Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830, 841 (Pa. Super. Ct.),
allocatur denied, 523 A.2d 1132 (1986) (presumption is that employment at will
relationship exists unless clear intent to alter by handbook is stated therein). "A
contrary holding . . .could have the socially deleterious effect of causing employers

to forego publication and distribution of handbooks for fear that their intentions
would be misconstrued by the courts." Id.
168. For a general background and analysis of employer personnel policies as
they relate to their legal consequences in employee dismissal law suits, see H. PERRITT,
EMPLOYEE DIsMIssAL LAW AND PRACTICE 303-23 (1984) [hereinafter PERRITT].

169. Decker, Handbooks and Employment Policies as Express or Implied Guarantees of Employment - Employer Beware! 5 J.L. & COM. 207, 211 (1985) [hereinafter
Decker].
170. A.

CHANDLER, TIlE VISIBLE HAND: THE MANAGERIAL REVOLUTION IN AMER-

ICAN BusINEss

7 (1977).

171. Decker, supra note 169, at 210.
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regulations 7 2 reduces the potential for arbitrary supervisory action.
By increasing fair application of standards, via the use of handbooks, this potential is reduced. Employees not having the benefit
of knowledge of the employer's policies have no reasonable expectations of performance,' 73 with the inevitable result of inefficient
operation. The same is true of disciplinary and termination procedures. If these are not communicated, the employee does not know
what constitutes acceptable conduct and therefore is unable to
knowingly abide by the policies of the employer. However, "[tihe
purpose of an employment manual is to explain the rules of employment to the employee-not to confer tenure, or arm the employee with grounds for suing the employer if the latter fails to
' 74
follow the rules in the manual to the letter.'
A serious concern about the employer's ability to operate his
own business on his own terms and conditions arises over the issue
of whether and to what extent an employer can modify, amend or
delete terms contained in the employment manual. In deciding
Duldulao, the Illinois Supreme Court relied heavily on Pine River
State Bank v. Mettille 75 but provided little guidance to Illinois
employers. Reasonable interpretation of Duldulao supports the idea
that employers may be bound ad infinitum to the terms and conditions regarding termination and discipline contained in the handbook at the time it was accepted by the employee, which leads to
some strange possibilities as considered by the Illinois Appellate
76
court in Carter v. Kaskaskia Community Action Agency:1
The curious implication of Carter is that the employer who
issues an employment manual . .. cannot alter the manual
without compensating the employee-otherwise the alteration would be an unenforceable modification because not
supported by consideration, unless, perhaps, the employer
earmarked a portion of the employee's next paycheck as
77
compensation for the change.
A disclaimer or reservation of the right to amend or modify
the handbook provision may be of little protection to the em172. PERRITT, supra note 168, at 309.
173. Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 619,

292 N.W.2d 880, 894 (1980).
174. Enis v. Continental Illinois National Bank, 795 F.2d 39, 40 (7th Cir. 1986).
175. 333 N.W.2d 622 (1983). See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
176. 24 I11.
App. 3d 1056, 322 N.E.2d 574 (1974).

177. Enis, 795 F.2d at 40-41.
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ployer.7 8 The tone of the Duldulao decision suggests the court may
narrowly construe any attempt at a disclaimer against the employer,
thereby following similar decisions in other jurisdictions. 7 9 Through
its decision in Duldulao, the Illinois Supreme Court has provided
the employee with greater job security at the expense of the employer's freedom to operate his organization according to his best
judgment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The modern trend is to erode the common law doctrine of
employment at will. Illinois is no exception to this movement and
has significantly altered the traditional employment relationship,
which allowed an employer to terminate her employee for any reason
or no reason whatsoever. This has been accomplished by judicial
decisions prohibiting the employer from discharging an employee in
violation of a nebulous "clearly mandated public policy" and in
contravention of terms contained in an employee handbook. The
result of these rulings has been to shift the balance of power so that
employers are now significantly constrained in their abilities to
manage their own businesses while employees remain completely
unrestricted in regard to any reciprocal commitment. It is suggested
here that Illinois courts resist further erosion of employer rights by
narrowly construing the recent Illinois Supreme Court decision in
Duldulao80 and by deferring to the Illinois General Assembly for
expressions of a clear mandate of public policy."' 1 Only with this
178. The court in Duldulao acknowledged the possible effectiveness of some
type of disclaimer, but this was not an issue in the case and the question was left
open. Duldulao v. St. Mary of Nazareth Hospital Center, 115 Ill. 2d 482, 491, 505
N.E.2d 314, 319 (1987).
179. See Huber v. Standard Insurance Co., 841 F.2d 980 (9th Cir. 1988)
(provision that either party could terminate relationship on thirty days notice was
overridden by covenant of good faith and fair dealing); Aiello v. United Air Lines,
818 F.2d 1196, (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 826 F.2d 12 (1987) (introductory assertion
of employment at will relationship did not disclaim responsibilities created by detailed
listing of company responsibilities in same manual); Loffa v. Intel Corp., 153 Ariz.
539, 738 P.2d 1146 (1987) (agreement signed by employee that employer retains right
to terminate employment found inapplicable to orientation materials outlining disciplinary policies and procedures); Schipani v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Mich. App. 606,
302 N.W.2d 307 (1981) (despite employee signing acknowledgement that his employment was at-will, court allowed cause of action to prove employer's literature created
an implied contract of job security).
180. See supra text accompanying notes 166-179.
181. See supra section III B of this Comment.
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judicial restraint will the rights of the employer, the employee and
society be properly and efficiently represented.
WALTER

W. TIMM

